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A RECENT WORK ON THE RELIGIONS OF TIBET AND MONGOLIA

BY

D. SEYFORT RUEGG

The twentieth volume in the series "Die Religionen der Menschheit" is devoted to the religions of two of the most important ethnic and cultural groups of Inner Asia and contains contributions by two eminent scholars, one a specialist in Indo-Tibetan studies and the other in Mongolian studies ¹⁾).

The first part of the volume (pp. 7-291) comprises an account of the religions of Tibet which is the outcome of Professor G. Tucci's prolonged study of Tibetan religious literature combined with a first-hand knowledge of the country and people that is unsurpassed among Western scholars; as such his contribution is without doubt the best and most comprehensive available historical and phenomenological description of the Tibetan religions, and it provides a kind of distillation of the author's research on the subject published in his monumental *Indo-Tibetica* (four volumes, Rome 1932-1941) and *Tibetan painted scrolls* (three volumes, Rome 1949), as well as in a number of monographs and articles.

The survey of Mongolian religion forming the second part of the volume (pp. 293-427) by Professor W. Heissig is presented by its author as being 'in the first place philology applied to the statements of the Mongolian religious texts' (p. 297) such as those edited by him in 1966 (*Mongolische volksreligiöse und folkloristische Texte*, Wiesbaden 1966). And because he considers that the Lamaism of the Mongols resembles the Lamaism of Tibet inasmuch as it derives from it, and that Mongolian Lamaism accordingly does not represent a separate and distinct "theological" development (p. 299; cf. p. 336), the author refers back to Tucci's contribution instead of undertaking a separate description of what might, by way of contrast, be termed the non-popular and non-folkloristic form of Mongolian Buddhism; hence the body of his contribution consists

¹⁾ Giuseppe Tucci und Walther Heissig, *Die Religionen Tibets und der Mongolei*. Die Religionen der Menschheit, herausgegeben von Christel Matthias Schröder, Band 20. Stuttgart, Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1970, 448 pp., ill.

of an account of Mongolian shamanism and the popular form of Mongolian Buddhism ²). It is worth noting here at the outset that Tucci makes little use in his contribution of the rather vexed notion of shamanism (which, in the case of Tibet, would tend to involve the explanation of the obscure by the even more obscure ³).

In the following these two contributions will be briefly summarised and certain points in them will be discussed.

I

G. Tucci's contribution is divided into seven chapters. Chapter I (pp. 13-29) deals with the *sna dar*, i.e. the earlier diffusion of Buddhism in Tibet. Although the traditions relating to the conversion to Buddhism of King Sroñ·bčan·sgam·po and a resulting diffusion of that religion in Tibet are hardly to be taken as providing a historically precise account of exactly what happened, T. points out that in view of what we know of Tibet's relations at that time with two countries in which Buddhism was established—China and Nepal—the existence of at least some modest Buddhist centres can safely be assumed even for such an early period (p. 14) ⁴). T. next discusses the role played by King Khri·lde·gčug·bčan (ca. 704-755) as a possible propagator of Buddhism (as suggested for example by the sKar chuñ inscription ⁵) of his son, the Buddhist King *par excellence*, Khri·sroñ·lde·bčan, ca. 755-797), despite the fact that the determined opposition of his ministers evidently did not allow the king's efforts to bear much fruit (p. 14). Attention is here pertinently drawn to certain interesting parallels in the early history of Japan (p. 17). The following pages are given over

²) Although Tucci and Heissig do not give detailed definitions of their uses of the word Lamaism, Heissig's use of it seems to differ from Tucci's at least to the extent that for him it appears to denote the canonical, orthodox and non-popular Buddhism as introduced from Tibet (see pp. 297, 299), while in Tucci's usage the term covers not only the canonical but also the indigenous and so-called popular aspects of Tibetan Buddhism (see pp. 43, 182).—On the various connotations of the different uses of the term Lamaism see below, pp. 309-310.

³) All the entries under Schamane, Schamanismus etc. in the Index to the volume under review refer to pages of Heissig's contribution, but Tucci does mention the subject (pp. 216, 228). See below, p. 315.

⁴) A comparable view has also been taken by M. Lalou, *Chine et Tibet aux VII^e, VIII^e et IX^e siècles*, *Journal des savants*, Octobre-Décembre 1965, pp. 636 f.

⁵) Cf. H. E. Richardson, *JASB* 1949, p. 45 f., and *JRAS* 1957, p. 69; G. Tucci, *Tombs of the Tibetan kings* (Rome 1950), pp. 51, 104.

to a discussion of the complex religious—and religio-political—developments under King Khri·sroñ·lde·bcan, and in particular to the relations and frictions between the Indian Buddhist schools (represented by such differing personalities as the adept Padmasambhava and the philosopher Śāntarakṣita) and the Chinese Ch'an school, and also between their Tibetan protagonists—Ye·śes·dbañ·po for example on the one side and on the other Myaṅ Tiñ·ne·'jin and Vairocana (considered by the rjogs·chen school as its patriarchs) ⁶⁾—which eventually led to the famous debates constituting the “Council of Tibet” (pp. 17-21) ⁷⁾. In a section on the consecration of monks and the foundation of monasteries T. discusses an interesting (though probably later) passage of the *Padma thañ yig* which speaks of the coexistence of two monastic disciplines, one of which prescribes residence in a monastery, vegetarian food and abstinence from alcoholic drink, while the other does not insist on these rules and calls for the practice of meditation in cells (*sgrub khañ*); nevertheless, since both of the groups governed by these rules consist of monks, they are both bound to practise celibacy (p. 22), so that there is here no question of an opposition between monks in the strict sense and married religious (a dichotomy attested elsewhere in the history of Tibetan Buddhism). In his treatment of Glañ·dar·ma's disinclination towards Buddhism, T. points to the social and economic factors that may have dictated a policy of opposition to the Buddhist clergy (p. 25); further on the possibility that the king may have been under the influence of Śaivism is also noted (p. 236-7 note) ⁸⁾.

In the last section of chapter I, T. returns to the question of the Indian and Chinese elements in Tibetan Buddhism, and he calls attention to the links existing between the Indian Siddha school and the Chinese Ch'an (which indeed have many attitudes and traits in common), as against the more scholastically oriented “gradualist” Buddhism of Śāntarakṣita and his successors. The

⁶⁾ Śāntarakṣita is nonetheless regarded by the rjogs·chen as one of its masters, so that the Indian scholastic component is by no means lacking in this school.

⁷⁾ Though bSam·yas rather than lHa·sa is mentioned in Tibetan sources as the place where the debate between the Hva·śaṅ and his opponents took place, it is probably more proper to refer to a “Council of Tibet”, as recently suggested by P. Demiéville (TP 56 [1970], pp. 42, 65), since the debates no doubt took place in more than one place (as noted also by Tucci, *Minor Buddhist Texts* II [Rome 1958], p. 285-287).

⁸⁾ This suggestion goes back to H. E. Richardson, *JRAS* 1957, p. 76.

“simultaneist” (*cig car* = *yugapad*) approach advocated by the Hva·śaṅ Mahāyāna’s Chinese school (as well as by the Indian Siddhas) is seen by T. as founded on the theory of the natural luminosity of Mind and the Buddha-Nature (or *tathāgatagarbha*) present in all sentient beings, and on the recognition or “anagnosis” of this Nature (p. 26) ⁹. Now it is true that the “gradualist” schools of India and Tibet which generally follow the doctrine of the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*—and therefore the tendency introduced into Tibet by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla—make relatively little mention of the Buddha-Nature and *tathāgatagarbha* in connexion with the Path of Intuition (*abhisamaya*) leading to the Fruit of Awakening (*bodhi*), whereas their opponents—the Hva·śaṅ and the Ch’an in general—on the contrary very much emphasise this factor. However, it should at the same time be pointed out that the exegetical tradition connected with the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* does recognise a factor that can be interpreted as closely related to, if not identical with, the *tathāgatagarbha*, namely the *prakṛtisthagotra* (*raṅ bžin gnas rigs*) which in fact constitutes one of the chief topics of the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*. Moreover, the “gradualist” Indian and Tibetan commentaries on the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* also stress the principle of the natural luminosity of Mind. It does not therefore seem possible to regard the Ground (*gži*) of spiritual practice and *bodhi*—which is variously known as the Buddha-Nature, the *tathāgatagarbha*, the *prakṛtisthagotra*, and the natural luminosity of Mind—as forming the basic point at issue in the debate between the Hva·śaṅ and his “gradualist” opponents. The dispute between them appears in fact to have concerned chiefly the Path of Awakening rather than its Ground. T.’s further suggestion (p. 27) that not only the rJogs·chen but also the Jo·naṅ·pa school developed an essential aspect of the Hva·śaṅ’s thought is closely linked with the above-mentioned supposition; but although the *tathāgatagarbha* theory does indeed play a vital and fundamental role in the doctrines of the Jo·naṅ·pas, and a kind of special relationship has in fact often existed between the Jo·naṅ·pas and

⁹ Cf. P. Demiéville, *Le concile de Lhasa* (Paris 1952), p. 116 f. But on the fairly rare occurrence of the notion of “anagnosis” (*pratyabhijñā* etc.) in the Buddhist traditions see D. Seyforth Ruegg, *Traité du tathāgatagarbha de Bu ston Rin chen grub* (Paris 1973), p. 78 note 1. (It may seem to some that in several other parts of the present book also T. overstresses similarities between Śaivism and certain aspects of Buddhism [see for example pp. 86, 99, 121], although it is true that a number of parallels do exist. This will be a fruitful topic for further research.)

certain rJogs·chen masters, the link in this case appears again to be based less on any common theory concerning the Ground of Awakening than on a comparable theory of absolute reality, which posits an absolute devoid only of heterogeneous factors (*gžan ston*) rather than of all *dharma*s (as in the *rañ ston* or *svabhāvaśūnya* theory of the *Madhyamaka*). In other respects the Jo·nañ·pas seem to stand closer, doctrinally as well as institutionally, to the majority of the other Tibetan schools; and they recognize the “gradualist” *Abhisamayālaṅkāra*, unlike the Chinese traditions to which this text is unknown. It is probably not without significance in this connexion that the Tibetan opponents of the Jo·nañ·pas seem nowhere to have accused them of being more or less disguised followers of the Hva·śaṅ, something they could surely be expected to have done were there any reason to do so, for this is precisely the accusation brought against certain masters of the rJogs·chen and bKa’·brgyud·pa schools by their critics¹⁰).

Concerning the outcome of this “Council of Tibet”, attention is called to the discrepancies between the Tibetan and Chinese accounts; and T. regards the Tibetan tradition regarding the victory of the opponents of the Hva·śaṅ as all the more unreliable as it belongs to a later period (p. 27)¹¹). But at the same time he notes already for the time of King Ral·pa·can (Khri·gCug·lde·bcan, 815-838) the clear decline of interest in the “Dhyāna” school among the Tibetans as indicated by the catalogue of the Royal Library, the lDan dkar ma (which he dates to 812, rather than to a date either 12 or 24 years earlier, which would fall under that king’s predecessor, as is done by some other scholars)¹²). The rJogs·chen school nevertheless continues to show points of contact with the Hva·śaṅ’s school (p. 28), as is indeed avowed in the 14th century by no less an authority of that school than Klon·chen·rab·’byams·pa.

Chapter I closes with observations on the complexity of the

¹⁰) Cf. D. Seyfort Rugg, *La théorie du tathāgatagarbha et du gotra* (Paris 1969), p. 443; *Le traité du tathāgatagarbha de Bu ston Rin chen grub*, p. 3-7.

¹¹) T. does not refer to the recent attempts to reconcile the difficulties; thus D. Ueyama assumes that the Hva·śaṅ was indeed victorious in a first confrontation between the Indian and Chinese masters taking place in about 782 at lHa·sa or elsewhere, and in which he was opposed not by Kamalaśīla but by Śāntarakṣita, but that the Chinese were finally defeated by Kamalaśīla in a subsequent debate at bSam·yas. V. *Tōhō gakuho* 35 (1964); P. Demiéville, *TP* 56 (1970), p. 40 f.

¹²) Cf. G. Tucci, *Minor Buddhist texts* II, p. 46-48.

Buddhist traditions introduced into Tibet from Central India, Kashmir, Nepal, Afghanistan, Gilgit, and Central Asia, not to speak of China, and to accommodations made by Buddhism with the religious substrata with which it came into contact outside as well as inside Tibet (pp. 28-29).

Chapter II (pp. 30-42) analyses the accounts given by the Tibetan historians of the *phyi dar*, i.e. the second diffusion of Buddhism in Tibet after its eclipse during the reign of *Glañ·dar·ma*, starting with the activity of *dGoñs·pa·rab·gsal* in Eastern Tibet and of similarly inclined monks in Central Tibet. T. subjects the historicity of the traditional accounts to a critique in which mention is made of the chronological uncertainties relating to the dating of the beginning of the *phyi dar* due to the fact that in some accounts a whole 60-year cycle seems to be unaccounted for; the only certain fact at this point is the synchronism between *Grum·Ye·šes·rgyal·mčhan*, a disciple of *dGoñs·pa·rab·gsal* = *dGe·ba·rab·gsal*, and Chao Hsüan-ti (905-907) (p. 32 note). T. concludes then that *Bu·ston's* classic account is an attempt to establish continuity between the *sña dar* and the *phyi dar* by telescoping together what actually took place during two cycles (*Rig·pa'i·ral·gri* actually intercalates a period during which the Buddhist Teaching was not actively practised but was in abeyance between the death of *Glañ·dar·ma* and the beginning of its propagation under *Rin·chen·bzañ·po*, *Atiśa*, *rÑog·lo·tsā·ba*, and *Mar·pa*) (p. 33). But at the same time T. does point to the undoubted vitality of Buddhism in the border provinces, from which it is said to have been reintroduced to Central Tibet, and to the impetus that Central Tibet—and Buddhism—must have received after the expulsion of the religiously very active Tibetan colony from the Tun-huang area; this event in fact took place in 848, in other words not long after the beginning of the persecution of Buddhism associated with the name of *Glañ·dar·ma*. The hypothesis of at least some measure of continuity does not then in itself seem altogether inappropriate (p. 34).

The author next turns to the developments that took place in Western Tibet at the time of *Rin·chen·bzañ·po* and *Atiśa*, both under Kings *Ye·šes·'od* and *Byañ·chub·'od* and under the early Malla dynasty which also controlled *sPu·hrañs* (pp. 35-41). Finally he gives a short account of the foundation of the great Tibetan religious centres and monasteries, starting with *Ža·lu* in 1040, and of some important events in the history of Tibetan Buddhism up to the time of the establishment of the Mongol empire in the early 13th

century (pp. 41-42). During this period Tibet was governed by abbot-princes (or prince-abbots), and by myriarchs whose functions carried on a form of political organisation existing under the Old Kingdom; and although they indeed came to be appointed officially by the Mongol Emperor, the nomination of these hegemons generally merely confirmed an already existing situation: "their enfeoffment is of a purely formal kind, the intervention of the Yüan and of the succeeding Chinese dynasties being limited to granting patents of appointment in given cases and to receiving in return, at fixed periods, the gifts of the individual chiefs. Nevertheless this involved a fundamental confirmation with grave consequences for the future" (p. 42)—consequences that have indeed only been fully realised in the last decades.

Chapter III (pp. 43-61) is devoted to a "general characterisation" of Tibetan Buddhism. T. emphasises the point that this form of Buddhism—to which like many other scholars he often refers as "Lamaism"—includes ritual elements and magically determined attitudes which were current in Tibet before the introduction of Buddhism, and that at least the liturgical aspect of this Lamaism together with many of its mythological concepts diverge from the forms of Buddhism known from the available literary sources of Indian origin (p. 43). But very properly in this reviewer's opinion he goes on to qualify this statement by adding that if we were in a better position to reconstruct the "gnostic-magical" Vajrayāna as it was understood and practised at that time in Uḍḍiyāna (Swāt) or Bengāl for example, we should certainly be able to observe very many more similarities with "Lamaism" than we might at first sight be inclined to suppose (p. 43-4). The point is also stressed that the scholastic framework and the ritual of "monastic Lamaism" must constantly be considered in relation to the classical Buddhist tradition (p. 44).

Once these restrictions have been made—and they have been well made by T.—the question arises as to whether Tibetan Buddhism is fundamentally or at least to a significant degree typologically different from Buddhism as we encounter it in its living forms in South Asia. And the historian of religion may then have to consider just what is to be conveyed by the frequently used, but perhaps rather ambiguous, word "Lamaism". Is it to be employed merely as a designation for Buddhism in Tibet, Mongolia and the regions dependent on these two countries, in which case it is nothing but a convenient substitute for the expressions "Tibetan Buddhism" or

"Mongolian Buddhism"? Or is the use of this word on the contrary to be taken to imply some fundamental divergence of Tibetan and Mongolian Buddhism from the "real" and "original" Buddhism of India? Indeed, in the past the word "Lamaism" has often been used to designate a supposedly degraded form of Buddhism quite different from "real" and "original" Buddhism. In that case it may well be thought desirable to use the word Lamaism with the utmost circumspection until such a time as it might be actually demonstrated that the Buddhism of Tibet and Mongolia is essentially and substantially at variance with "true" Buddhism. Alternatively, given the central position of the *bla ma* or Guru in both Tibetan Buddhism and Bon, the use of the term "Lamaism" may perhaps be justified as an expression applicable to all the classical religions of Tibet inclusive of Bon; for it is clear that Bon has historically undergone a separate early development from Buddhism, although with the passage of time it has come to be partly assimilated to Tibetan Buddhism not only in its literary and iconographical expressions (despite the very considerable differences that remain in these two domains) but above all perhaps in the sentiments of at least some contemporary followers of Bon who have actually been educated in part in Buddhist establishments, so that Bon sometimes figures virtually as another *chos lugs* or "school" of Tibetan *chos* or "religion" (as opposed to a specifically Buddhist *chos* = *dharma*)¹³. Were this last use of the word "Lamaism" to become accepted, it would no longer refer to Tibetan (or Mongolian) Buddhism alone, but also to a religion whose development has sometimes run parallel to or converged with Buddhism while at other times it has diverged from it. It would seem that these questions are in need of urgent consideration in the historical and phenomenological treatment of Tibetan religion.

Chapter IV (pp. 62-126) deals with the teachings of the principal *chos lugs*, i.e. the schools of Tibetan Buddhism. The presuppositions common to all or most of them are first summarised, and the preeminent role of the Mahāyāna in Tibet is underlined. It does not however seem altogether correct to state that in Tibet the Śrāvakayāna (or Hīnayāna) found no favourable ground and had as a result no great diffusion (p. 64); in fact the whole of the Vinaya, the foundation of the monastic discipline in Tibet as else-

¹³ V. P. Kvaerne, *Numen* 19 (1972) p. 23-24 (whose observations however raise a number of serious questions).

where in the Buddhist world, belongs technically, according to the standard Tibetan classification itself, to the Śrāvakayāna, as does also the Abhidharma, which is one of the five major subjects of study pursued in a Tibetan seminary. The view of the Tibetan tradition itself is rather that Tibetan Buddhism, founded as it is on the whole of the Buddhadharma (*sañs rgyas kyi chos*) or Śāsana (*bstan pa*), comprises the various cycles (*'khor lo*) of the Buddha's teaching; as such, it is necessarily founded on the scriptures belonging to the Śrāvakayāna as well as on those of the Mahāyāna. Hence, although the Mahāyāna together with the Vajrayāna was no doubt the predominant force in Tibet, and the Mahāyānist Madhyamaka is generally regarded there as the highest expression of Buddhist philosophical thought, the opinion current among some scholars that Tibetan Buddhism is Mahāyānist in a restrictive sense exclusive of all other parts of the Buddhist teachings is surely in need of modification; at all events this opinion is often combatted by the Tibetans themselves.¹⁴)—With respect to the Mantrayāna (or Vajrayāna) T. stresses its 'gnostic' (or 'gnostic-magical') character; for it is concerned with the realisation of an 'esoteric consciousness' that is not ratiocinative knowledge, but ecstatic and blissful consciousness the actualisation of which is aided by ritual acts having the power to release forces that bring about the transformation of the individual (p. 65-6). This is of course not meant to suggest that Tantrism is merely a continuation of the gnostic movements of West Asia, though mutual influences may well have been operative; it is rather basically a question of similarities in attitude, and of an attempt on both sides to replace exclusively ratiocinative thought by an experience of liberation that transcends ordinary experiences bounded by space and time

¹⁴) Cf. G. Tucci, *Minor Tibetan texts II*, p. 138. It is however correct to say that in Tibet the particular philosophical positions (*grub mtha'*) of the Śrāvakayānist schools were rejected in favour of those of the Mahāyāna when they differed from the latter. In other words, it is necessary to distinguish clearly between the first cycle (*'khor lo*) of the Buddha's teaching comprising, according to the Tibetan classification, the teaching intended in particular (though not exclusively) for the Śrāvakas, and the peculiar philosophical tenets of the Śrāvakāyānist schools, which the Mahāyānists did not consider to be founded in fact on the Buddha's teaching when properly understood.—Cf. *Bodhisattvabhūmi* § 1.8 (p. 96): *samāsato bodhisattvo bodhisattvapiṭakam paryeṣate śrāvakaṭṭhakaṃ ca*, "in sum the Bodhisattva follows the scripture of the Bodhisattva and also the scripture of the Auditor".

through a kind of projection into absolute Space and Time (p. 66) no longer experienced as limiting conditions.

There follows a summary of the three-fold scheme of Ground (*gži*), Path (*lam*) and Fruit (*'bras bu*) to which reference has already been made above, and which make up one of the chief analytical categories of Tibetan thought; of the four purities, the four consecrations (*dbañ*, *abhiṣeka*), and the Mantrayānic way of realisation; and of 'photism', that is to say the concept already alluded to above that consciousness *per se* is luminous. The succeeding sections are devoted to the Jo·nañ·pas' quasi substantialistic version of the *tathāgatagarbha* theory, to the doctrines of the bKa'·brgyud·pa school, and to the spiritual experiences based on the Anuttaratantras which are known chiefly from their Tibetan versions. Special attention is then given to the rÑiñ·ma·pa school in the form of a long and valuable account of its rJogs·chen teachings along with its particular classification of the Tantras into six classes in the framework of its system of nine Vehicles (*theg pa*); of its theory of knowledge or noësis (*rig pa*), and of error (*'khrul pa*) as a property of ordinary mind (*sems*)¹⁵, and of its "simultaneist" *khregs chod* theory alongside the rapid all-encompassing *thod rgal*, based on the photistic principle of the luminosity of pure consciousness or Mind as such (pp. 103-104). In the rÑiñ·ma as well as in the Jo·nañ·pa T. perceives a certain Śaiva influence (pp. 86, 99; cf. p. 121).

Chapter IV closes with a summary in which is discussed the nature of Buddhist soteriology as the common foundation of all the various schools above and beyond doctrinal differences; T. indeed emphasises the point that in Tibetan Buddhism the whole of cognitive activity is directed toward the goal of liberation (p. 112). In this connexion the fundamental importance of Mind, its luminosity and the psycho-somatic support of spiritual activity—the *gži* or Ground—are once more recalled, as is the process of the identification of the spiritual "practiser" with the sacred or "divine" (*lhar bskyed*; p. 114). T. returns also to the question of the *tathāgatagarbha*, the immanence of which in the Jo·nañ·pa school's doctrines would, he suggests, bring Buddhist thought into line with Śaivism

¹⁵) This concern of the rÑiñ.ma.pas with mind and its characteristic features noted by Tucci should show that they were by no means the magicians and non-rational mystics that they have so often been represented to be. In fact, one of the sources of the rÑiñ.ma.pa theory of error (*'khrul pa* = *bhrānti*) as a property of mind is presumably the *bhrāntivijñāna* of the classical Indian Vijñaptimātratā doctrine.

(p. 121). With respect to the method of liberation especially in the Vajrayāna, T. makes the following important observation: "If contemplation and a willed and controlled discipline of meditation meet here in indissoluble unity, we may perceive in this one of the deepest and most original contributions of Vajrayāna-Buddhism and its Lamaist exegesis to the knowledge of the world of mystical experience. This contribution consists above all in posing the problem of the possibility of bringing about the purification of given reality. Tantric experience recommends with remarkable boldness, not so much the eradication of the inevitably and inexorably given human weaknesses—the innate tendencies traceable to certain basic affects—as their transfer to higher planes: the passions are not to be suppressed, for they are a fact specifically related with our being. Thanks to a gradual purification they become the instrument of their own annulment, the basis of reintegration, provided that the correct means of treating them is assured." (pp. 122-123)

Chapter V (pp. 127-181) deals with the organisation of the monastic order, its life and the religious calendar and holidays. This chapter is especially useful because of its detailed descriptions of the ritual utensils accompanied by line-drawings. Of particular interest also is an account of religious ceremonies as performed in sDe·dge supplied by Mr Nam·mkha'·nor·bu.

Chapter VI (pp. 182-234) is concerned with what the author terms the popular religion of Tibet. Already in an earlier chapter T. called attention to the incorporation into Tibetan Buddhism—and above all into its Vajrayānic form which is characterised by ordinarily inaccessible esoteric traits that presuppose an arduous process of purification and unusual qualities of character—of popular beliefs and of the magical outlook typical of the Tibetan (p. 126). Here he recalls the important point that there seem to exist remarkable analogies between the world of Tantrism and the native traditions of the areas in which it was introduced, a fact that is explained by the hypothesis of a related psychological atmosphere (p. 182)¹⁶. In this context reference is made also to a so-called "lay-Buddhism" (p. 184). The use of the terms "Volksreligion" and "Laienbuddhismus" is no doubt justifiable, although just what they refer to is in the last analysis often not alto-

¹⁶ An attempt to define some of these typological similarities—whether of a psychological or other origin—was made by the reviewer in *Sur les rapports entre le bouddhisme et le "substrat religieux" indien et tibétain*, *JA* 1964, pp. 77-95.

gether clear, and it is necessary explicitly to exclude any misunderstanding which might lead to the idea that these "popular" forms belong exclusively, or at least predominantly, to the laity alone. In fact the concepts treated in this chapter are known to, and accepted by, even some of the most learned and orthodox monks; and the fact that they assign such concepts to the worldly (*'jig rten pa* = *laukika*) level of convention (*tha sñad* = *vyavahāra*) and surface truth (*kun rjob* = *saṃvṛti*), rather than to the level of absolute reality, does not change the fact that they do countenance them; indeed they assign the whole of the conditioned (*'dus byas* = *samskrta*)—including their own monastic and philosophic conventions—to this very level. (Conversely, it is not impossible for a layman to show little interest in the so-called lay or popular Buddhism.) Contact with both monks and laymen thus leads one to the conviction that the familiar concept of "popular" and "lay" Buddhism remains in need of more precise structural definition; for not only does it seem that the division between the canonical and non-canonical forms of Buddhism does not always coincide exactly with the opposition monk/layman, but observation shows that in Tibet as elsewhere amongst both monks and laymen many factors—geographical, social, etc.—go to determine the extent to which an individual's Buddhism may be "classical" or "popular". (Similar problems relating to the "great" and "little" traditions are of course familiar to the sociologist and anthropologist.) A much more pertinent pair of categories than lay/monastic, or literary/non-literary, would here seem to be the categories *'jig rten pa* (= *laukika* "worldly")/*'jig rten las 'das pa* (= *lokottara* "supramundane") parallel to the two "truths" (*bden pa* = *satya*) in Buddhism ¹⁷).

¹⁷) It could of course be argued that the monks who countenanced such non-canonical concepts unattested in a Buddhist "great tradition" succumbed to an ambient indigenous "little tradition" and have thus "gone native". However, it does not seem that such a supposition can account for the facts; for the monks in question remain well aware of the specific doctrines of the canonical Buddhist tradition, which they continue to recognise as corresponding to the deep truth of ultimate reality (*paramārthasatya*), at the same time as they countenance notions which relate to conventional practice (*vyavahāra*) conforming to surface "truth" (*saṃvṛtisatya*). This situation seems then to be better accounted for by the hypothesis of a conscious distinction on the part of these monks between two levels, in harmony with Mahāyāna tradition in general and with the Madhyamaka in particular, the *laukika* being equivalent to the *vyāvahārika* level of *saṃvṛtisatya* while the *lokottara* refers to the *paramārthasatya*. Cf. Sur les rap-

T. of course himself refers to the problem in the study of Buddhism posed by the incorporation of "popular"—or *laukika*—gods etc. (p. 182-3). And in this context attention is furthermore called by him to possible influences from Taoism (p. 186), and to the interesting coexistence in Tibet of Chinese ("secular") astrology (the *nag rñis*) with the Indian ("Buddhist") *dkar rñis* (p. 192). As an appropriate designation for the popular religion of Tibet T. rejects the appellation *mi chos* on the ground that this term is complementary to *lha chos* (which came in the classical language to designate Buddhism) and has the wider meaning of customs and norms (p. 190).

The following sections of Chapter VI deal with offerings made to gods and daemons; apotropaic and exorcistic rites—called *mdos*, *yas*, *glud*, and *gto*—and the thread-constructions, termed *nam mkha'*, used in the *mdos* rite; the cosmogonic and other myths or legends (*lo rgyus*) which as it were explain a given ceremony by relating, and so to speak recreating, its origin and thus serve, in the fashion of archetypes or exemplars (*dpe*), to transcend the temporal and to bring the performer of the rite back to what existed *illo tempore* "once upon a time", that is outside limiting time and space (p. 202; cf. pp. 222-3, 228-9, 232). In the fourth section the complex question in the Buddhist context of a plurality of "souls" or vital principles—designated by the different terms *bla*, *srog*, *rnam šes*, etc.—is brought up; and T. observes that with respect to this plurality of souls Tibetan religion preserves ideas that are to be found especially amongst the Chinese and the peoples of northern Central Asia (shamanism, p. 228) and Southeast Asia (p. 212). With reference to the Tibetan conception of death and the intermediate state (*bar do* = *antarābhava*), the author speaks of a progressive break-up of the fundamental doctrines of Buddhism in Tibet, a process which he indeed regards as the continuation of a tendency already present in Indian Tantrism (p. 214). Mention is made also of Iranian and shamanistic parallels to the Tibetan concept of the *bar do* (p. 216; cf. p. 228). The topics discussed in this chapter are thus of particular interest for the study of the interaction between Buddhism and pre-Buddhist religious substrata or non-Buddhist adstrata (cf. pp. 227-230). In particular, there is to be observed a process of "demythisation" (Entmythisierung) to which Buddhism subjected the surviving elements, or reminiscences, of the old mythological concepts which it incorporated and involving a re-ports entre le bouddhisme et le „substrat religieux" indien et tibétain, *JA* 1964, pp. 77-95.

interpretation of Tibetan myths (p. 231). Conversely, side by side with this process one can observe a process of transvaluation and revalorisation of myths, as in the case of the life and deeds of the "thaumaturge" Padmasambhava, which represents a Buddhist mythologising process (p. 232).—In sum, in the boundless mass of forces and *numina* affecting more or less capriciously the lives of men for better or worse, Buddhism figures as the Norm regulating the world (p. 234).

Chapter VII (pp. 235-275) is devoted to Bon. Described to begin with as the indigenous (einheimische) religion of Tibet (p. 235), Bon is thereafter more clearly characterised as the designation for the pre-Buddhist Tibetan religion (p. 235; cf. p. 251 note 13). The probable etymological connexion of the term *bon* with the word *bod* "Tibet" is pointed out, while a connexion with a verb meaning "to pray" (*bon pa*) is also mentioned. The links between Bon and areas of the Indo-Iranian borderlands are emphasised (cf. p. 272), as are those with the Eastern borderlands and China (pp. 236-7, 241, 275). And the possibility of influences derived from Śaivism as well as from Zervanism and Manichaeism is also noted; such links with Śaivism could be not direct but due to contact with the rJogs·chen, which may have transmitted them to Bon (pp. 236-7; cf. pp. 242, 268)—though in the case at least of the creator figure in Bon the rJogs·chen, as a Buddhist school which does not recognize a creator god, cannot be supposed to have acted as the intermediary (p. 238). (The parallels between Tibetan religion and Śaivism often alluded to by T. might be thought to pertain more to Bon than to Tibetan Buddhism; this question requires further research.)—The differences between the various forms of Bon depending on the geographical area and social groups in question in each particular case are then stressed (pp. 240, 244, 256); for the Bon religion has clearly evolved in the course of time as a result of changes in Tibetan society due to contact with other peoples and religious concepts (p. 247). T. rejects the idea that Bon was originally a religion of prayer to heaven (as suggested perhaps by the term *gnam bon* "Heaven-Bon") (pp. 241, 251, 273). While similarities between Bon and shamanism are pointed out, T. concludes that certain and decisive traces of ecstatic shamanism are hardly to be found (p. 268). In connexion with Bon, T. brings out once again the importance of mythical origins and the "recreation" of a *primaeva*l state existing *illo tempore* in the form of an archetypal exemplar (*dpe*) (pp. 245-6, 258-9).

An interesting interpretation is then presented of the figure of King Gri·gum, from the time of whose death at the hands of his minister Tibetan tradition traces the break in the royal link with heaven (through the heavenly cord, *dmu thag*, which had allowed the king to return to heaven), and the need for a king to be buried when he was therefore no longer able to return to heaven. According to this interpretation, this "event" gives a kind of historical and temporal expression to the appearance of the *dur bon*, or "Grave-Bon", which was connected with a megalithic culture employing burial rites, i.e. with a culture in which chthonic gods had the leading place and came to exist side by side with the luminous heavenly gods of the other form of Bon, the *gnam bon* (p. 248 f.). The interrelation of these two forms of Bon is seen as that of two religious traditions resulting either from the superposition or from the coexistence of two diverging conceptions: the cult of heaven and the ancestors on the one side, and a chthonic cult characterised by megalithic burials on the other (p. 274). King Gri·gum appears as an example of the schismatic king possessed by a demon—just as Glañ·dar·ma (whose possible connexion with Śaivism has already been mentioned) was to be in the Buddhist tradition (p. 249). But the relation between the *dur bon*, the *gnam bon*, and other forms of Bon is not to be understood in the sense of a merely chronological sequence, for it corresponds to a division of religious types that is complementary rather than temporal (p. 251).

Tucci's contribution closes with a chronological table, a list of original Tibetan sources, and another list of studies in modern Western languages up to about 1967/8. The list of 163 Tibetan sources is arranged alphabetically rather than by subject or category, and in most cases only the titles are given without any indication of the authors; certainly the addition of the usual bibliographical information would have greatly added to the usefulness of this list of Tibetan religious texts.

II

W. Heissig's contribution entitled 'Die Religionen der Mongolei' is divided into five chapters. Chapter I (pp. 299-304) sets out the two headings under which the author treats Mongolian Buddhism: "Lamaism" and "popular religion" (Volksreligion). H. seems generally to use the word Lamaism to designate the classical literary form of Mongolian Buddhism, as distinct from its popular form as well as the various forms of shamanism, for he writes (p. 299):

“Eine Darstellung des Lamaismus bei den Mongolen würde der des Lamaismus in Tibet gleichen, denn der Lamaismus in der Mongolei blieb, geistig von Tibet abhängig, dem orthodoxen Lamaismus treu”. And he explains (p. 297): ‘Da die Formen des nördlichen Buddhismus in der Mongolei im Prinzip dem Buddhismus entsprechen, von dem sie ihren Ausgang nahmen und den Professor G. Tucci so erschöpfend im ersten Teil dieses Bandes nicht nur beschrieben, sondern auch erklärt hat, so blieb außer einer kurzgefaßten Darstellung der Ausbreitung des Buddhismus in der Mongolei allein die Schilderung dieser volksreligiösen, nicht-buddhistischen Glaubensvorstellungen der Mongolen als Aufgabe übrig.’—The specificity of Mongolian religious history resides then in the encounter of this Lamaism with the ancient beliefs of the Mongols, the influence the latter exerted on it and their further development into the Mongolian popular religion under pressure from Lamaism (p. 300).

Chapter II (pp. 305-324) is devoted to an account of the shamanism of the Mongol peoples based on Mongolian sources as well as on Chinese accounts and European reports ranging from those of Plano Carpini and Marco Polo to that of P. S. Pallas which dates from the 18th century. Male and female shamans—the *böge* and *iduγan* (or *uduγan*)—are known from pre-Buddhist times amongst the Mongols (p. 320); and stress is laid on the homogeneity of Mongolian shamanism as an organised mode of religious thinking (p. 300-1) distinct from the so-called popular religion of given social groups (pp. 300, 349). Moreover, if Buddhism in Mongolia has at the present time sunk to a condition where it is quite without influence, shamanism for its part subsists as a religious form despite all persecutions (p. 348). H. differentiates between three types of shamanism: 1) pure ecstatic shamanism (traces of which are, as already mentioned, hardly to be found in Tibet according to Tucci, p. 268); 2) mixed shamanism; and 3) “lamaised” shamanism (pp. 301, 308, 348, 349). According to H. pure ecstatic shamanism finds its expression in hymns and invocations (*daγudalγa*) (pp. 300, 349); it is seen by the author as originating from ancestor-worship (pp. 308, 310), as concerned with the past and present rather than with the future (p. 311), and as having no idea of another world since the dead ancestors are thought of as located in their places of burial (p. 316). As the epithet used to describe it indicates, ecstasy is considered to be its characteristic feature; in most cases this ecstasy is said to have been artificially induced by whirling, imbibing

certain intoxicants, and the use of drums (p. 316). H. is of the opinion that it is "darstellbar" in the current state of knowledge (p. 304), and in particular that the special character of pre-Buddhist Mongolian shamanism can be reconstructed by eliminating all divine names and concepts deriving from Lamaism (p. 308). Given the somewhat mechanistic nature of such a process consisting in expunging from a religious document all that might diachronically be considered to be of alien origin, its product as a description of a structured religious form would tend to be something of a *tour de force*; and it would seem desirable to call attention to the methodological limitations to which the process as thus defined is necessarily subject if the aim is to retrieve a synchronous religious structure that is convincing from the point of view of the science of religion.

Chapter III (pp. 325-337) traces the history of the first diffusion of Buddhism in Mongolia, starting from the time of Godan's meeting with Sa·skya·Paṇḍi·ta in 1247, and emphasises its political aspects. H. then turns to the second diffusion consecrated in 1573 by the invitation to visit Mongolia extended to bSod·nams·rgya·mcho by Altan Qan of the Tümet, who in 1577 built the first monasteries at his residence of Köke Qota. Subsequently the meeting of Abadai Qan of the Qalqa with bSod·nams·rgya·mcho, who was to be known as the Third Dalai Lama, led to the founding of the monastery of Erdeni juu in 1586. And in 1588 the Fourth Dalai Lama, Yon·tan·rgya·mcho, was born as the son of a Qalqa prince. Thus, by the beginning of the 17th century the Southern Mongol peoples were in close contact with Tibetan Buddhist leaders. Next, the religious importance of the reign of Ligdan Qan (1604-1634) is brought out; not only did monasteries continue to be built during his reign but there took place an event of major literary and cultural importance: the translation of the Tibetan bKa'·'gyur into Mongolian in 113 volumes was compiled in 1628-9 by collecting together translations made since about 1580 during the second diffusion, revising earlier translations made during the first diffusion under the Yüan, and adding new translations. It thus appears that in the quite short space of only some 70 years—from 1559 to 1629—the Mongols achieved an impressive degree of intellectual development which included the production of original works, both religious and secular; the rapidity of this development can best be compared with the speed with which Buddhism was implanted in Tibet in the latter part of the 8th and the beginning of the 9th century.

Chapter IV (pp. 338-348) describes the suppression by Buddhist missionaries of old Mongolian religious practices, symbolised by the destruction of the idols of the tutelary spirits (*ongγod*) by Neyiči toyin (1557-1653) and Caya Pandita (1599-1662); these measures against shamanism are ascribed to the personal initiative of the Dalai Lama (p. 341).

At the same time attention is drawn in this and the following chapter to the efforts initiated already in the 17th century—also at the behest of lHa.sa and the Dalai Lama (p. 336)—to absorb into Buddhism certain old religious practices of the Mongols. Responsible for these efforts were the first lCan·skya, Nag·dbañ·blo·bzañ·chos·ldan (1642-1714), who assimilated the Tibetan “warrior gods” (*dgra lha*) with their Mongolian counterparts (p. 401) and incorporated the tutelary deities of Činggis Qan and his descendants (p. 346; cf. p. 369, where H. states that a ‘Lamaist divinity Saṅghapāla’ was identified with the Činggis qan sülde tngri, i.e. the *tngri*-genius of Činggis Qan); sMon·lam·rab·byams·pa·bsTan·jin·grags·pa, who continued this process and also incorporated into the Mongolian Buddhist pantheon certain animal-headed tutelary divinities of Mongolia (p. 346); Mergen diyanči blama-yin gegen Blo·bzañ·bstan·pa·i·rgyal·mčhan, who recognised the old ancestor-worship and the associated ancestor-idols (*ebügen-ü ongγod tngri*) (p. 366), composed as a kind of national liturgy a prayer to Činggis Qan (p. 369), and adopted the old Mongolian fire-cult (p. 379-380), the incense-offerings to Čayan Ebügen (p. 386), the cult of the god of the palladia (*sülde tngri*) (p. 397-8), and the *obo*-cult (p. 413); and the second lCañ·skya Rol·pa·i·rdo·rje (1717-1786), who directed his attention to Kuan-ti (p. 408-9). A more recent example of this activity was that of Ilayuṣan qutuγtu mergen bandida Don·grub·rdo·rje (1820-1882), who contributed to a fusion of the figures of Geser, Kuan-ti and the Dayisun tngri (p. 410). It may be noted here that this reception of Geser into Mongolian Buddhism as a protective deity had at almost the same time a Tibetan parallel in the work of the Khams·pa Ju·Mi·pham (1846-1912), who wrote on the cult of Ge·sar as a *dgra bla/dgra lha*. It would be instructive to compare the factors that gave rise to these two more or less contemporary movements; for these efforts at synthesis, whether syncretistic or more organically structured, merit close attention; and comparison with similar tendencies in Tibet (and in other Buddhist countries) is likely to bring interesting results for the history of religions.

H. considers that it is chiefly in these efforts, carried out though they were at the behest of lHa'sa and the Dalai Lamas, to incorporate the Mongolian popular religion into the liturgical structure of Lamaism that Mongolian Buddhism shows specific local developments differentiating it from Tibetan Buddhism; and these developments thus confer on Mongolian Buddhism a character that he finds otherwise lacking in it (p. 336). It may be felt that in this respect H. has perhaps somewhat underemphasised the specific character of Mongolian Buddhism in its classical literary form (though it is true that on p. 299 he specifies that he has in mind the lack of what he calls a "theologische Sonderentwicklung"). For anyone who has worked with both Tibetans and Mongols cannot but perceive that the latter have their own characteristic attitudes and approach which occasionally differentiate them from the majority of Tibetans (but which sometimes have their parallels with some Eastern Tibetans, such as the Amdobas). For example, the fact that the Buriats do not appear to have among them recognised incarnate (*sprul sku*) Lamas is a noteworthy trait that certainly distinguishes them from the Tibetans, as well as from the Eastern Mongols who have their Qubilyans and Qutuγtus. This distinctiveness may perhaps pertain above all to the Western Mongols—Buriats and Kalmucks—domiciled for a long time in Russian territory. But even the writings of a Mongol from Urga such as Ṣag·dbaṅ·dpal·ldan (born in 1797) bear a scholastic stamp characteristic of the Mongol scholars and do not appear to have exact equivalents from Tibet. (These traits of course do not diminish the doctrinal orthodoxy of such Mongol scholars which H. has stressed.) It was indeed largely because of these qualities that the Mongols scholars have so often been highly appreciated by the Tibetans and have been rewarded with high honours in the monasteries of Tibet by being appointed abbots and tutors of prominent Tibetan lamas, including the Dalai Lama himself and members of his family. Hence, even outside the limits of the so-called popular Mongolian religion it may well be possible to speak of certain specific characteristics of Mongolian Buddhism. If these have passed unnoticed, the reason may be that so few Mongolists have at the same time been Tibetologists (and *vice versa*), the goal of Tibet-Mongolian studies being largely a desideratum to be realised in the future.

Chapter V, the last and by far the longest (pp. 349-420), is devoted to a description of the Mongolian popular religion (Volksreligion)

and its pantheon on the basis of the above-mentioned collection of texts published by the author as well as on other sources published by N. N. Poppe, A. Mostaert, C. R. Bawden, and other scholars. As components of this pantheon H. enumerates Eternal Heaven (*möngke tngri*), the heavenly gods (*tngri*), the ancestor-god, the fire-god, Čayan Ebügen, the Great Bear (*doluγan ebügen*), and mounted gods (Reitergottheiten, a category that overlaps with that of the *tngri*), to which he appends the cult of the earth and the *obo*-cult. The rituals of the popular religion (as distinct from shamanism as well as Buddhism) are defined as those that are carried out by laymen, by members of a given family or other social group, or by a lay religious (*qara baγsi*) without the aid of either a shaman or a Buddhist monk (pp. 301, 349); in fact, H. remarks on the high degree of similarity in expression in the prayers belonging to the popular religion. Amongst the most wide-spread expressions of the popular religion H. cites the *sang* ~ *ubsang* (< Tib. *bsan*) "incense-offering" and the fire-prayers (*öčig*) (p. 349-350). It is indeed remarkable that a ritual considered to be characteristic of the Mongolian *popular* religion such as the *sang* should have a name derived from Tibetan. The sections of the last chapter devoted to a description of the chief divinities of the popular religious pantheon are accompanied by translated extracts from prayers addressed to them; H. often has occasion to point out Tibetan and other foreign traits in them (pp. 356, 358, 362-4, 375, 378, 381, 386, 396, 401, 406, 412, 413).

Heissig's contribution also closes with a chronological table and a useful bibliography of works on Mongolian religion.

III

That the contributions contained in this volume should differ from each other in their approach to and treatment of such a matter as the religions of Tibet and Mongolia is only natural considering that they have been written by two authors with different outlooks and starting from different premisses. But from a purely material point of view a reader who is not a Tibetologist may encounter difficulties due to the fact that within this volume different systems of transcription of Tibetan have been employed. Thus the same word can appear in two different forms and can therefore even have separate entries in the Index (e.g. *rje btsun/rje bcun*; *c'os/č'os*; *Sroñ btsan sgam po/Sroñ bean sgam po*). Such disparities should surely have been avoided in a series such as the

“Religionen der Menschheit” addressed also to non-philologists. The way Tibetan terms have not infrequently been quoted in an abbreviated form—especially without the particles *pa*, *ba*, etc.—could also prove difficult for the non-specialist, who may therefore experience inconvenience in identifying a word; examples are *rnam par šes* (p. 171, for either *rnam šes* or *rnam par šes pa*), *ādul* (p. 49, for *ādul ba* as on p. 45), *brgyud* (p. 59, for *brgyud pa*), *rnam par rtog* (p. 62, for *rnam rtog* or *rnam par rtog pa*), *rig* (p. 62, for *rigs pa*). Similarly the proper name dGe rab gsal (pp. 32, 34) is in the sources usually spelt dGe·ba·rab·gsal (as on p. 32 note 4). Confusing moreover is the fact that the two words *ston pa* (= *śūnya*) and *ston pa ñid* (= *śūnyatā*) have frequently been translated into German by the same word ‘Leere’ (pp. 46, 68, 218), although the former term is an epithet (‘leer’) of any *dharma* and refers to its non-substantial relative nature (*ran bžin gyis ston pa* = *svabhāvaśūnya*), whereas the latter term is on the contrary a noun (‘Leerheit’; ‘Leere’) expressing *the truth that* all *dharma*s are empty and therefore referring to the absolute of the Mahāyāna¹⁸). It is to be hoped that Tucci’s contribution will before long be published in its original version, for scholars will wish to be able to consult in its original form a work that will remain a classic (for example, on p. 237, the German translation ‘unwirksam’ for *byed mkhan la mi ltos* ‘independent of an agent’ is not possible, and it cannot be supposed to translate accurately what was written in Tucci’s [Italian or English?] original).

¹⁸) It is true that inconsistencies are sometimes encountered in the texts, where Sanskrit *śūnya* has on occasion been translated by Tibetan *ston pa ñid* instead of *ston pa* (examples are to be found in the Tibetan translation of Chapter XXIV of Candrakīrti’s *Prasannapadā* on the *Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikās*). And it is also true that the situation is complicated by the fact that *ston pa ñid* translates not only *śūnyatā* “Emptiness”, a term relating to the level of absolute truth, but also *śūnyatva* “the property (or: fact) of being empty” which of course relates to all *dharma*s. Yet, as a general rule, the Tibetans do clearly distinguish between *ston pa* as an adjective applicable to all *chos* = *dharma*s and *ston pa ñid* as a noun.—On the Indian side, in a case where a verse of the *Madhyāntavibhāga* (I.13) refers to *śūnya* when *śūnyatā* is in fact the topic in question, the commentator Sthiramati explains that the suffix of state (*bhāva*pratyaya) has been “elided” (*luṭṭa*) for metrical reasons. Of course, according to the Prajñāpāramitā literature and the Madhyamaka, *śūnyatā* is itself empty of own-being (*svabhāvaśūnya*); and Sthiramati points out that *śūnyatā* is no more different from what is empty than are *duḥkhatā* from what is painful or *anityatā* from what is impermanent, for it is the *dharma*tā of *dharma*s.

As observed at the beginning, this volume supplies a long-felt need for an authoritative survey of the religions of two of the most important civilizations of Inner Asia; and any remarks or criticisms of details made above are in no way meant to detract from the great significance and value of the work. The specialist in the history of Buddhism and Inner Asian culture will find these contributions by an eminent Tibetologist and an eminent Mongolist highly informative and useful treatments of the subjects; and the student of religions for his part will at last have at his disposal reliable and detailed accounts of these religions which cannot be overlooked in the comparative and historical study of religion.

Addendum to p. 315. — On the question of the *bar do* (= *antarābhava*) compare this writer's observations in *T'oung Pao* 56, pp. 341-3 note (at end) and *Central Asiatic Journal* 17 (1973), p. 83.